NOW IS THE TIME FOR ALL GOOD MEN...
LLOYD N. CUTLER*
The American Constitution usually is described as a system based on Montesquieu's principle of the separation of powers. In reality, as Richard Neustadt has observed, it is a system based on the principle of separate branches exercising shared powers. ' In Philadelphia, Montesquieu's adherents won at best only half a loaf. 2 Indeed, the Convention's failure to adopt the other half was the main argument of those who opposed ratification. As the Federalist papers (Nos. 47-51) make clear, the framers decided to blur the strict separation of powers in order to advance the equally important and "nearly irreconcilable" 3 principle of checks and balances. They decided the best way to maintain checks and balances among the branches was to allow at least one other branch to share in each power principally assigned to a different branch. As Madison stated in The Federalist No. 48 , "unless these departments be so far connected and blended as to give each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to a free government, can never in practice be duly maintained. '4 The Constitution contains many examples of connected and blended powers. No branch, not even the judiciary, can exercise its principal powers free of some control by at least one of the other two branches. Congress must present its legislation to the President, who can veto subject to a two-thirds override by both Houses. 5 The President must submit his appointments and agree-ments with other nations to the advice and consent of the Senate. 6 His acts as Commander in Chief, in conducting foreign policy and in executing the laws, can be sharply restricted by congressional legislation or refusals to grant his legislative requests, or by the last resort of impeachment. 7 Actions of Congress or the President, or of both acting together, can be set aside as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. 8 Congress and the President can check the courts by the appointment/confirmation process and by exercising their power under article III to enact laws defining the jurisdiction of the lower courts and the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 9 As is true of all shared powers, the sharers of power must figure out a way to cooperate with one another, or the result is deadlock. We sometimes tend to congratulate ourselves on the supposed virtues of inefficiency and stalemate in democratic government, but the constitutional convention was convened because of the utter despair of its members over governance under the Articles of Confederation. Although the framers carefully protected against the risk of tyranny, they also tried to design a system that would be more efficient than the one that it was intended to replace. 10 The resulting system of separate branches exercising shared powers has worked well to prevent another tyranny, and continues to do so. For the first 160 years of the Republic-until about 1950-it also permitted the national government to function powerfully and decisively when a need for bold action arose at home or abroad. For the last four decades, however, the national government has been characterized by an abnormally high degree of deadlock on major issues of domestic and foreign policy. I believe the explanation lies in the changing role of our national political parties. [Vol. 30:387
The original Constitution makes no mention of political parties." Indeed, in The Federalist No. 10, Madison vigorously criticizes "faction" as the bane of all republics, and describes the system of separate branches as designed specifically to prevent the "mischiefs of faction.'
1 2 Yet he was careful to define "faction" as those who join to pursue a selfish interest "adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community."' 3 That definition would not appear to cover a broadly based national political party that cuts across narrow interest groups.
In any event, when Madison and the other framers confronted the practical problem of making their brave new system work, they found it necessary to offset the centrifugal force inherent in the separate executive and legislative branches with a countervailing centripetal force. They proceeded to organize two broadly based national political parties, one led by Hamilton and Adams and committed to the concept of an expansive central government, and the other led by Jefferson and Madison and committed to the concept of more limited central government. The elected President and the elected legislators of the same party had a greater natural affinity for cooperation with one another than with the legislators of the other party, and this affinity tended to offset the institutional wariness between the Executive and Congress in exercising their shared powers. This "two-party" system has continued to the present day, although a shift of magnetic polarity has developed in the sense that the present Democratic party, the direct descendant of the party of Jefferson and Madison, has come to favor expansive central government, while the present Republican party, the indirect descendant of the party of Hamilton and Adams, has come to favor more limited central government.
Although this "two-party" system continues, its success in fostering cooperation between the branches has declined remarkably. In thirty-five out of the thirty-eight presidential elections held from John Adams's victory in 1796 through Harry Truman's in 11. In the Constitution as amended to date, the only reference to the existence of parties is an indirect one. The 24th amendment abolishes the poll tax for "any primary or other election." U.S. CONsT. amend. XXIV, § 1948, the party winning control of the White House also won a majority in both the House and the Senate. This proposition held true for ninety-two percent of these elections. 14 The only exceptions in the nineteenth century were the elections of Zachary Taylor, Rutherford B. Hayes and Grover Cleveland for his first term. 15 In the twentieth century, until Dwight Eisenhower won his second term in 1956, the party winning the White House always won control of the House and Senate.' 6 Eisenhower's second term, however, signalled the beginning of a polar shift: the party winning the White House has failed to win a majority of one or both Houses in six out of the last nine presidential year elections. 17 And starting with Richard Nixon's first election in 1968, the party winning control of the White House has failed to win a majority of one or both Houses in five out of the last six presidential year elections.
The modern phenomenon of divided government is the main reason we now have deadlocked government most of the time. The close correlation between the two is illustrated by the persistent high budget deficits and by the recurring struggles between the President and Congress over the use of American military forces or weapons around the world.
High budget deficits, of course, are not an intended goal of national policy. Presidents and congressional leaders of both parties oppose high deficits, and most polls show that the public shares this view by a large margin.'" High deficits occur when the President and Congress cannot form a consensus on a mix of taxes and competing expenditure programs that will create a reasonable balance between inflows and outflows. High deficits are the conse- -22, 1988 . Fifty-nine percent of 3021 adults surveyed nationwide said deficits were a "bad thing"; 20% disagreed; 5% responded that deficits were neither good nor bad; and 16% were undecided. [Vol. 30:387 quence of deadlock between the executive and legislative branches in the exercise of their shared power to legislate.
In modern times high deficits have occurred only with divided government. Economists generally accept that three percent or more of the GNP is the telltale sign of an unacceptably high deficit. 19 We have had ten such deficits since World War II. Every single one occurred during a time of divided government-Truman's in fiscal 1948 , Ford's in 1975 and 1976 , and Reagan's seven in 1982 through 1988 The correlation between unacceptably high deficits and divided government is much too exact to be a coincidence.
Largely because of the undeclared war in Vietnam, Congresses and Presidents since Richard Nixon's first election in 1968 have been in constant struggle over another part of their shared powers-the power to deploy and use our own armed forces abroad and to supply weapons to other governments and insurgent forces. Other contributors to this issue have described the constitutional ambiguities that give rise to this struggle.
2 1 The significant point is that the War Powers Resolution itself was enacted over President Nixon's veto at a time of divided government, and that every subsequent executive-legislative dispute over the application of the Resolution (the Marines in Lebanon, the reprisal attack on Libya, the invasion of Grenada and the current naval deployment in the Persian Gulf) has arisen during a time of divided government. Similarly, Congress has checked the President by setting aside or refusing to authorize weapons transfers to foreign governments or insurgents only during times of divided government. Congress blocked President Nixon's proposed arms sales to Turkey after the 1974 Cyprus crisis. Congress checked President Reagan on proposed weapons transfers to the armed forces of the governments of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan 22 and to the insurgent contras in Nicaragua, 3 as well as to the police forces of South Africa and South Korea. 4 Conversely, during President Carter's administration-the only unified government since 1968-Congress never challenged the President's deployment or use of our forces abroad, for example in the attempt to rescue our hostages in Iran. Further, although Congress insisted on various minor modifications, Congress never acted to block his arms transfers to Arab governments, to El Salvador and to the insurgents in Afghanistan. 25 Once again, the correlation between divided government and deadlock on these critical foreign policy-national security issues is too exact to be a coincidence.
Another political sea change helps to explain the remarkable rise in the incidence of divided government: the steady decline since World War II in voter loyalty to a single party. The weakening voter loyalty to a particular party is the result of many factors, most of them probably irreversible. Changes in technology have had a major impact. In the days of paper ballots, straight ticket voting was promoted by each party's practice of having its workers outside the polling place offer each voter a printed ballot bearing only the names of its own candidates for each office. The voter then could place the printed ballot directly into the ballot box. These straight ticket ballots were much easier to use than the official ballot carrying the names of all candidates and requiring the voter to check the preferred name for each office. 30 This handy arrangement became outmoded with the shift from paper ballots to state-supplied voting machines. The development of radio and television was an even more important technological change, exposing individual candidates to many more voters than in the past and permitting candidates to impress their individual personalities on each voter's mind. Until political radio broadcasts became widespread in the 1930s, whether even one percent of all voters actually heard or saw the presidential candidates is doubtful. Even the Senate and House candidates were heard and seen by much lower percentages of their constituents than they are today. Now that all candidates can expose their individual characteristics to all voters, the candidate's party label has much less significance.
The other principal factors that led to the decline in voter party loyalty are the "progressive" reforms of the patronage system and of the nominating and electoral processes. These reforms began before the turn of the century and continue to this day. Under the 28. This figure is derived from the data in M. BARONE patronage system, local, state and national party leaders dispensed government jobs. Even welfare and medical assistance to the needy was often provided directly through party leaders, rather than by the government as such." The shift to a professional civil service and state welfare systems deprived the parties of these important tools for cementing voter loyalty. With the introduction of the primary system for party nominations, the power to nominate passed from party leaders to the voters at large, and candidates became free to go over the heads of the leaders in direct appeals to voters. Once primaries became widespread, candidates no longer depended on the party to finance their nomination and election campaigns; they turned instead to well-heeled individuals and interest groups, who quickly learned they could exert far more influence on the issues by giving money directly to candidates than by giving money to a political party.
Another remarkable consequence of these developments has been the transfer of political power from party leaders, both in and out of office, to individual candidates for the House and Senate. Incumbent Congressmen and Senators who become candidates for reelection are the most conspicuous beneficiaries of this transfer. The views of party leaders are far less important to these candidates than the views of the individuals and interest groups who provide the candidates with the money needed to win election or reelection.
Incumbent candidates, of course, can deliver more immediate legislative results than mere challengers. This fact enables them to raise much more money for the next campaign than their challengers, giving incumbents an enormous advantage in primary and general elections. They not only have more money; they have it much earlier, a factor that discourages many would-be challengers from even making the race. 2 In 1986, an astounding ninety-eight percent of all House incumbents of both parties who ran for reelection 31 . Id. at 178. 32. Federal Election Committee records show that as of June 30, 1988 , four months before the election, congressional incumbents of both parties had raised an average of $257,506, compared to $30,117 for challengers. Political Action Committees, who provided 40% of these funds, gave over 95% of their contributions to incumbents. Wash. Post, Aug. 29, 1988, at A4, col. 4. [Vol. 30:387 were reelected." 3 Equally astounding, over the past thirty years a weighted average of ninety percent of all House and Senate incumbents of both parties who ran for reelection were reelected, even at times when their own party lost control of the Presidency itself. As these statistics show, even when the congressional minority party wins control of the White House, it faces long odds in its efforts to win back a majority of the House and Senate. This result is in sharp contrast to what happens in parliamentary governments in which the chief executive is not elected by a separate ballot. When Canada voted the Liberal Party out of power in 1984, only sixty percent of all incumbents who ran for reelection, and only twenty-six percent of all Liberal incumbents, were reelected.3 5 Canada's economic and cultural patterns are very similar to our own, but modern Canadian voters, with only one federal ballot to cast, remain much more party-conscious than American voters with multiple federal ballots to cast.
One may fairly ask what is so bad about the rising phenomenon of divided government. Many thoughtful people fully recognize the cost of deadlock but see a heavier cost in a return to party loyalty and unified government. 3 They regard the hodgepodge of inconsistent national decisions and nondecisions under divided government as the best available consensus that can be achieved among the diverse interest groups that make up so huge and variegated a nation. They see the consensus as conceding enough to each group to avoid a degree of divisiveness that would impair the national unity. They fear that unified government would give an administration too much power to work its will, leading to the kind of extreme swings in national policy that have occurred since World War II in the United Kingdom and creating the bitterness that has grown among Britain's competing interest groups. They also note that in 1974 divided government helped to expose the excesses of an arbitrary and corrupt President and force his resignation. They -Our national government makes far more major decisions today than ever before. The competing interests involved in each decision are much more complex, but the decisions still must be made. We hold government responsible today not merely for the goals set forth in the preamble of the Constitution -to establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, and provide for the national defense. We also hold government responsible for the management of the national and world economies and the defense of the entire free world. Even conservative incumbents like President Reagan now accept this broad mandate.
-Because of the growing interdependence between our own national economy, national security, and domestic tranquility and that of other nations, many of our government's decisions involve reaching and keeping agreements with other governments. As the Italian Prime Minister so vividly put it at the Venice Economic Summit of 1981, "we are all in the same gondola." '41 Without unified government, agreements with other governments are extraordinarily difficult to make because the danger of checkmate or deadlock is so high. 42 In times of divided government, the Presi- 42. The problem is of course aggravated by the constitutional requirement that a twothirds vote of the Senate is required for its consent to a treaty. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Over 40 treaties submitted to the Senate since World War fl either have been rejected or dent of the United States is likely to be the only major head of government who cannot commit the government he heads.
-In a divided government, both parties and their elected officials usually condemn the resulting hodgepodge of outcomes, yet manage to avoid being held accountable for them. As we have seen, the ability of incumbents of both parties to shift the blame and win reelection has been phenomenal. A unified government usually will be held accountable for its errors and omissions-such as an intolerably high deficit-at the next election. A divided government will not; indeed, most of its participants will be reelected. 43 -If we can succeed in restoring unified government, there is little risk that we will veer from one extreme policy to its opposite, or that significant interest groups will become severely disaffected. We had unified government for most of the time before World War II, and putting the split over the constitutional entrenchment of slavery to one side, neither of these grievous consequences befell us. In contrast to the United Kingdom, the constitutional role of the Supreme Court limits the extremes to which unified government can take us. The Court will not permit a unified government to legislate beyond its constitutional powers or to impair basic constitutional rights. Moreover, the security of congressional incumbents encourages them to vote independently of their party leaders, and even a unified government cannot count on the votes of its legislative members to carry extreme measures that they and their financial supporters oppose. In part because of our diversity and size, but primarily because of the separation of the branches, unified government in America has never been efficient enough to achieve extreme and divisive results.
Unified government does not assure creative and effective government, but divided government comes close to assuring stagnant and ineffective government. All of the acknowledged great Presidents-the Mt. Rushmore quartet of Washington, Jefferson, Linhave never come to a vote. See Letter from Robert E. Dalton, Esquire, Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to the author (Nov. 13, 1984) .
43. This applies even to the incumbent President. Of the five incumbent Presidents since World War II who ran for another term at a time of divided government (Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, Ford and Reagan), all but Ford were returned to office, and Ford missed only by a narrow margin. Conversely, the voters held President Carter accountable in 1980 for the results of his unified government.
[Vol. 30:387 coln and Theodore Roosevelt, as well as Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt-presided over unified governments."" One can hardly think of a single major legislative program in this century-with the exception of the Reagan 1981 tax cuts-that was adopted during a period of divided government; and that change occurred in the brief honeymoon period during the first year of President Reagan's first term. 45 A return to unified government would not impair the congressional power to oversee executive performance and curb executive excesses. Nor would it restore the arbitrary power of party bosses and legislative leaders. Popular primaries and the democratization of congressional procedures are here to stay. These reforms, together with the penetrating surveillance of the investigative press, are sufficient guarantees that the basic constitutional checks and balances will continue to function. They do not depend on divided government to work. The Republican Teapot Dome scandal, for example, was exposed during a time of Republican unified government, with Republican lawyer Owen Roberts 46 playing the same independent prosecutor's role that Archibald Cox was to fill in the Watergate scandal half a century later.
Even if the case for reducing the current high incidence of divided government is accepted, one can fairly ask whether this is possible today, or whether the factors that have led to divided national government are now too strong to overcome. If we look beyond Washington, however, we can see that unified government is not an anachronism in modern democratic society. It exists in most of the other industrial democracies. It also exists in a substantial number of our own states. 47 The fact that unified government continues to flourish in these other nations and in many of our own state governments is strong evidence that its recent decline in our national government is neither inevitable nor irreversible. If we consider the available methods of reducing the possible frequency of divided government, changing our laws governing elections is preferable to the far more difficult task of adopting constitutional amendments. Indeed, constitutional amendments may not prove necessary. Although some elements of the Constitution do raise significant barriers, unified government managed to prevail for most of the time until about 1950.
Three possible changes in our election laws are worthy of study: 1. Providing by federal statute that the presidential election be conducted two to four weeks before the congressional election. 8 If voters already knew to which party they had entrusted the White House before they cast their votes for members of the House and Senate, they could make a more deliberate decision as to whether they wished to give the President-elect's party a majority in both Houses so that the party's program could be enacted. Although voter participation in a separate and later congressional election might be slightly lower than in the earlier presidential election, a two-stage election would maximize the new President's chances, in the early euphoria of his own election, to win a majority for his party in the House and Senate. This has been the effect of the twostage elections now conducted in France under the Constitution of 3. Amending federal campaign financing laws to provide for public financing of congressional campaigns, on the condition that the candidates agree not to raise or spend any other funds. This same condition is in the law establishing the Presidential Election Campaign Fund, 5 1 which the Supreme Court upheld as constitutional 52 and which has worked remarkably well. 53 If Congress enacted such a law for congressional campaigns, incumbents would lose their present money-raising advantage. The law also would greatly enhance the congressional minority party's chances of winning House and Senate majorities as well as the White House.
If these statutory measures did not achieve the desired result, lowering some of the barriers raised by the Constitution itself would be necessary. One significant barrier is that half of all House and Senate elections are held in years when there is no election for President. In these "off-year" elections, voters are even less likely to think of a party's incumbent President and its congressional candidates as a team. Indeed, it is a political truism that the President's party usually loses House and Senate seats in an off-year election, 54 thus increasing the prospects for divided government or aggravating the tendency to deadlock in an already divided government. This result could be corrected by amending the Constitution to provide for four-year terms for House members, running simul- 54. See HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 14, 1083-84; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (twoyear term for Representatives); art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (six-year term for Senators); and art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (four-year term for President).
taneously with the presidential term, and for a change in the Senate term that would result in holding all Senate elections in presidential election years. For example, all Senate terms could be shortened to the same four years as the presidential term, or the present three-class, six-year Senate term, with one-third elected every two years, could be changed to a two-class, eight-year Senate term, with half (one senator from each state) being elected every presidential election year.
The other significant constitutional barrier is the Supreme Court's ruling in Buckley v. Valeo 55 that the first amendment bars Congress from imposing any direct limit on campaign expenditures. 56 Under this ruling, and in the absence of a public campaign financing law such as that proposed above, 57 congressional incumbents cannot be deprived of their enormous money-raising and money-spending advantage. This ruling severely diminishes the congressional minority party's chances of winning congressional majorities when it wins the White House. An amendment specifically authorizing Congress to impose reasonable statutory limits on campaign expenditures for federal office would remove this constitutional barrier to unified government.
These are all rather modest proposals. None of them would shake the foundations of the Republic. Singly or in combination, they would not alter the basic political system. But in my view at least, they would significantly improve the chances of restoring unified government as the normative condition of governance under the American system of separate branches exercising shared powers. [Vol. 30:387
